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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the process of globalization continues, the world is starting to 
resemble a single community with a shared economy, culture, and 
knowledge. However, the effects of globalization do not necessarily 
translate into positive outcomes. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, 
for example, has driven the entire world into a difficult economic 
recession. This crisis not only demonstrates how closely integrated 
the world economy has become, but also demonstrates the need for a 
global legal system that can promote harmonious co-prosperity. 
Every nation has a legal system that reflects its national culture. 
Historically, most political structures involved some form of 
monarchy, but democratic political structures are much more 
common today. In modern democracies, legal systems are designed 
to reflect the opinion of the nation’s people through the mechanism 
of voting. A democratic legal system, however, is not always 
reflective of a nation’s traditional culture. Indeed, as the culture of a 
nation changes, its legal system often changes with it. This principle 
can be observed through the global trend toward democratic 
governance, which has led many nations to implement democratic 
processes that are often very different from their traditional political 
systems. Because a unified legal system facilitates cultural and legal 
harmony between nations and because such harmony is essential to 
the development of the global community and economy, it is likely 
the current trend towards democratic governance will continue in the 
future. 
It is difficult to imagine the development of the global economy 
without the development of a corresponding global legal system 
because the two concepts are so interconnected. Accordingly, 
organizations that facilitate harmony among global legal systems are 
becoming increasingly important. These international organizations 
help to unify the global community in a number of areas, and they are 
likely to be increasingly necessary in the future as a new international 
legal system emerges. Furthermore, as the global community 
becomes more economically integrated, it is expected that the need 
for military power will greatly diminish. As trade barriers between 
states decrease, enterprises have little, if any, need for military 
support to conduct business in other states. Below is a table 
displaying current military expenditures for a host of countries as a 
percentage of global military spending.1 
 
                                                           
1 Military Spending Worldwide, VISUAL ECONOMICS, 
http://www.visualeconomics.com/military-spending-worldwide/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
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Country Spending in Dollars Global Military 
Spending 
United States $711 billion 48% 
Central and South 
America 
$30 billion 2% 
Latin America $39 billion 3% 
Sub-Saharan Africa $10 billion 1% 
Russia $70 billion 5% 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
$82 billion 5% 
East Asia and 
Australasia 
$120 billion 8% 
China $122 billion 8% 
Europe $289 billion 20% 
 
As the table shows, countries spend an enormous amount of 
funds on military expenditures—funds that could be used for other 
more beneficial purposes. The existence of excessive military power 
increases the risk of global conflict. Accordingly, the global 
community should manage world military power under a common 
legal system. But, for such a system to work, the global community 
would need to agree on a set of rules to govern the system.  
A similar approach should be taken in developing a global 
economy. While military power was the dominant force of the past, 
economic power is much more influential today. Thus, because the 
basis of economic power is cooperation, it is essential that the global 
community comply with rules established by an international legal 
system for humankind to prosper in the future. This Article will focus 
on the creation of a global legal system to promote global economic 
development. Specifically, the Article will address the following 
three topics: the development of global organizations, economic and 
legal systems, and international legislation.2  
                                                           
2 A fourth topic, harmonizing tax treaties and domestic laws, will be discussed in related 
article anticipated to be published in the Spring 2011 issue of the Brigham Young University 
International Law & Management Review.  
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS  
Just as every nation has a domestic legal system for its national 
administration, the international community needs a legal system for 
its international administration. Since every nation has a different 
cultural and historical background, it is not easy to create a unified 
legal system that satisfies each country’s needs. Nevertheless, the 
international community has made an effort to create a legal system 
that harmonizes the cultural and historical differences between 
nations, and as a result of these efforts, international organizations 
like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have 
been created. These international organizations are currently 
performing the global community’s most important functions.  
A. The United Nations 
Military power has historically been the deciding factor in world 
politics. In the absence of an effective international rule against wars 
of aggression, it was common for stronger nations to invade weaker 
nations more or less at will. Indeed, there was little reason for the 
stronger nations to exercise restraint. This unchecked power resulted 
in countless tragedies, and eventually the international community 
realized the importance of a mechanism that could facilitate 
international cooperation in the pursuit of peace. On June 26, 1945, 
just such a mechanism was created in the form of the United Nations 
(U.N.) Charter (U.N. Charter). The U.N. Charter, which consists of a 
preamble and 111 articles, continues to play an important function in 
the operation of the international community, and as of January 1, 
2009, there are 197 U.N. member states. 
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
The purposes of the U.N. are  
1) To maintain international peace and security, 
and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace;  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 7 
75 
 
2) To develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace;  
3) To achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion; and  
4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations in the attainment of these common 
ends.3 
It seems clear that the U.N. should play an increasingly important 
role in the international community’s efforts toward peaceful 
coexistence. 
B. The World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 
January 1, 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
between 1986 and 1994. As of January 1, 2009, the WTO has 153 
member states. The WTO is the only international organization that 
deals with “the rules of trade between nations.”4 WTO agreements 
are negotiated and signed by most of “the world’s trading nations and 
ratified in their parliaments.”5 The goal of WTO agreements is to 
“help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers 
conduct their business.”6 
The global community needs the WTO to assist in creating an 
open trading system. But what is the value of an open trading system, 
and why should the global community strive to achieve it? The WTO 
posits the following argument: 
  
The economic case for an open trading system 
based on internationally accepted rules rests largely 
                                                           
3 U.N. Charter art. 1, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
4 What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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on commercial common sense and the experience of 
world trade and economic growth since World War 
II. Tariffs on industrial products have fallen steeply 
and now average less than five percent in industrial 
countries. During the first twenty-five years after 
World War II, world economic growth averaged 
about five percent per year, and this high rate was at 
least partly the result of lowering trade barriers. 
World trade grew even faster during this period, 
averaging about eight percent per year. The data 
show an unmistakable statistical link between lower 
trade barriers and economic growth, and this link is 
supported by economic theory. All countries have 
assets — human, industrial, natural, and financial — 
that they can employ to produce goods and services 
for their domestic markets or for export. Economic 
theory predicts that nations “can benefit when these 
goods and services are traded.”7  
Thus, the WTO should continue to play an important role in the 
global economy and the development of a global legal system, 
especially since the WTO is already established in so many nations.  
C. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) describes itself as bringing together “the governments of 
countries committed to democracy and the market economy from 
around the world” in order to accomplish the following aims: 
 
1) Support sustainable economic growth 
2) Boost employment 
3) Raise living standards 
4) Maintain financial stability  
5) Assist other countries' economic development  
6) Contribute to growth in world trade8 
Since it was established in 1961, the OECD has facilitated the 
sharing of expertise and the exchange of views between more than 
100 countries, including Brazil, China, Russia, and many of the least-
developed countries in Africa. For more than forty years, the OECD 
                                                           
7 Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm.  
8 About OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2010).  
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has been one of the world’s largest and most reliable sources 
of economic and social data. In addition to collecting data, the OECD 
monitors trends and analyzes forecasts and economic 
developments. It researches social changes and evolving patterns in 
trade, the environment, agriculture, technology, taxation, and 
more. The organization provides a setting where governments can 
compare experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify 
good practices, and coordinate domestic and international policies. 
As of January 1, 2009, the OECD had thirty member states. 
In May 2007, OECD countries agreed to invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, 
Russia, and Slovenia to open discussions for membership. At the 
same time, the OECD also offered enhanced engagement with an eye 
toward future membership to Brazil, China, Indonesia, and South 
Africa. Because of the OECD’s ever increasing and significant role in 
governance, it should play an equally important role in creating a 
global legal system. 
D. Summary  
These organizations have the potential to be important players in 
the effort to create a legal system that would facilitate the 
development of the global community. The UN Charter, WTO 
agreements, and the OECD Model Tax Convention should become a 
part of any global legal system that may be established. Furthermore, 
just as a strong democratic society needs a good legal system and 
popular support in order to guarantee the well-being of its people, the 
global community needs a strong legal system in order to facilitate 
prosperity. Before a similarly successful and strong international 
legal system can be developed, however, it is important to understand 
how to create such a system. 
III. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL SYSTEMS  
A. The Economic Efficiency of a Rule 
In a society controlled by rules, economic activities are carried 
out under the auspices of the legal system. That is to say, the 
economic activities of enterprises and individuals are carried out 
within the scope of the state’s economic policy, and the economic 
policy of a state is made to be in harmony with the laws of the state. 
This means that economic activities are governed by rules.  
In order to encourage efficiency, rules must be developed from 
an economic perspective, which means considering the probable 
social benefit, expense, and corruption effect of a proposed rule. This 
issue will be discussed further in Chapter IV under the heading, 
“From the Regulatory Perspective.”  
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In a modern society, where cross-border and local transactions 
are closely integrated, it is very natural for most economic activities 
to be performed under an integrated system of domestic and 
international rules. Cross-border transactions by multinational 
enterprises are especially affected by the national economic policies 
of the states implicated in these transactions and by international 
economic rules—global economic policies—made by international 
organizations like the WTO and the OECD. Because so many 
organizations are involved in cross-border transactions, creating 
economically efficient international rules is vitally important.  
B. Role of the Government  
 Enterprises and governments often have different goals, 
particularly in an economic context. While enterprises attempt to 
maximize profits, the primary objective of government is to balance 
public finances. Nevertheless, governments should make an effort to 
create economic circumstances that enable enterprises to pursue 
profit maximization. In a free-market society where economic 
activities are performed based on consensual transactions, the 
government needs to create legal rules that facilitate a spirit of fair 
competition. When fair competition exists, an enterprise’s economic 
activities can contribute to society’s development. 
To create the best economic circumstances in a democratic 
society, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary should 
coordinate their efforts. The legislature should make rules that 
produce the best economic circumstances possible. The executive 
should fairly implement those rules. And, finally, the judiciary 
should decide whether a violation of those rules has occurred. When 
the branches of government all work together, rules are created and 
enforced in a way that allows enterprises to perform their economic 
activities in accordance with principles of fair competition, without 
harming the economy.  
C. Role of International Organizations 
The role of international organizations is becoming increasingly 
more important as transnational activities increase. Although the 
international community currently has no political structure 
comparable to what is found in individual states, international 
organizations are playing an important role in the international 
community. For example, agreements and model tax conventions 
made by the WTO and the OECD significantly affect transnational 
activities. 
Just as tax treaties promote international transactions by 
smoothing out the differences between the tax laws of contracting 
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states, rules such as the model tax conventions and countless other 
rules synthesized by international organizations do serve and will 
serve a similar function. For now, however, legal conflicts between 
domestic law and international norms often create difficulties for 
enterprises. Therefore, in order for the global community to develop, 
the study of legal conflict avoidance is essential.  
IV. DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION  
A. Established Purpose of International Organizations 
The U.N., the WTO, and the OECD focus on world peace, 
fundamental human rights, and global economic development. The 
preamble of the U.N. Charter reads: 
 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war…and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human 
person…to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom….9  
The WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1947 states: 
 
[The parties to this treaty,] [r]ecognizing that their 
relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full 
use of the resources of the world and expanding the 
production and exchange of goods, [b]eing desirous 
of contributing to these objectives by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce, 
                                                           
9 U.N. Charter, supra note 3, pmbl. 
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[h]ave through their Representatives agree [to enter 
into this treaty].10 
Furthermore, in Article 1 of the Convention,11 the OECD 
committed itself to promoting policies designed to: 
 
[A]chieve the highest sustainable economic growth 
and employment and a rising standard of living in 
member countries, while maintaining financial 
stability, and thus to contribute to the development 
of the world economy; to contribute to sound 
economic expansion in member as well as non-
member countries in the process of economic 
development; and to contribute to the expansion of 
world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with international obligations.12  
According to the founding documents of these organizations, 
they were established to promote world peace, fundamental human 
rights, and global economic development. 
B. Legislative Approach 
Economic development, whether domestic or international, is 
highly emphasized and valued in modern society. Accordingly, 
economic development has become the primary goal for most states. 
This section will discuss the importance of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) and tax treaties to both domestic and international economic 
development, and will also explore the equity of taxing rights among 
states. Furthermore, because states and international organizations 
pursue economic development through a variety of activities that are 
regulated by a set of corresponding rules and regulations, this section 
will explore a desirable mechanism for regulation and will emphasize 
the need for states to consider the negative economic effects of 
unproductive rules at the time of legislation. 
1) FTAs, Tax Treaties, and Taxing Rights 
Historically, human society has suffered from war, famine, and 
disease. Economic development has eased much of this suffering. As 
                                                           
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]. 
11 The Convention was signed in Paris on December 14, 1960. See Convention on the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development pmbl., Dec. 14, 1960, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_ 20118 51915847_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
12 Id. art. 1. 
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such, society must continue to work toward economic development 
to alleviate human suffering.  
In the past, developed countries often used military power to 
open new markets in underdeveloped countries and exploit them for 
economic profit. Today, it is no longer necessary to use military 
power to open a new market. As voluntary and tax-free international 
transactions increase, multi-national enterprises can conduct business 
almost anywhere without commercial barriers. Multi-national 
enterprises rarely encounter significant oversight from government 
regarding their business activities in other countries. Instead, these 
enterprises are primarily governed by the legislative activities of 
international organizations.13  
In light of the growing desire to develop an international 
economy, international organizations should go to great lengths to 
promote the free cross-border business activities of multi-national 
enterprises. To do this, international organizations should support the 
extension of FTAs and tax treaties, as well as equity in taxing rights 
between nations. 
a) Extension of Free Trade Agreements  
During the first twenty-five years after World War II, world 
economic growth averaged about five percent per year—a high rate 
of growth which was partly the result of lower trade barriers. World 
trade grew even faster, averaging approximately eight percent during 
the same period. Because data show a definite statistical link between 
freer trade and economic growth, the global community should 
promote free trade to bolster economic development worldwide.14  
One way to promote free trade is through trade agreements. 
Trade agreements help open markets and expand opportunities for 
workers and businesses. In short, they can help enterprises enter and 
compete more easily in the global marketplace. Trade agreements are 
also a tool for promoting fair competition and encouraging foreign 
governments to adopt open and transparent rulemaking procedures as 
well as non-discriminatory laws and regulations. Trade agreements 
can enhance the business environment by including terms that 
resolve issues that are of concern to businesses as well as terms that 
reduce or eliminate tariffs. 
                                                           
13 Since the need for developed countries to use military power to open up new markets 
has decreased substantially, and international organizations are now strengthening free cross-
border transactions, current military power should be used to perform a police function to 
ensure the peace and well-being of the global community. If this becomes the case, current 
military expenditures borne by each state will greatly decrease. When economic interchange 
between states (especially between Islamic and developed states) is enabled, conflicts deriving 
from cultural differences between these states will decrease significantly. 
14 See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV., http://www.export.gov/fta/ (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2010). 
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In light of the recent promulgation of Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) around the world, the WTO stated the 
following:  
[RTAs] have become a very prominent feature of 
the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). The surge 
in RTAs has continued unabatedly since the early 
1990s. As of 31 July 2010, some 474 RTAs, 
counting goods and services notifications 
separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO. 
Of these, 351 RTAs were notified under Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 31 under 
the Enabling Clause; and 92 under Article V of the 
GATS. At that same date, 283 agreements were in 
force.… The overall number of RTAs in force has 
been increasingly [sic] steadily, a trend likely to be 
strengthened by the many RTAs currently under 
negotiations [sic]. Of these RTAs, Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements 
account for ninety percent, while customs unions 
account for ten percent...15  
To understand the real economic effect of FTAs, it is helpful to 
observe the relevant statistics. The chart below reflects the growth 
from 2007-08 in U.S. exports to its trade agreement partners:16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
16 See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 14 (“The United States is party to many 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. Countries with which the U.S. has active bi-lateral 
trade agreements include: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, Oman, and 
Singapore. The active multi-lateral trade agreements that the U.S. has signed include the North 
American Free-Trade Agreement and the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The U.S. is also party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT, overseen by the WTO) along with 152 other countries. U.S. trade agreements 
with Panama, Korea, and Columbia are pending congressional approval. The U.S. is also in 
negotiations on trade agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland.”). 
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As the chart above clearly demonstrates, FTAs can help increase 
trade between nations. Thus, it is necessary to promote the further 
extension of FTAs to drive economic development in the global 
community. To promote FTAs, International organizations should
make an effort to build up a system of legal rules that will help break 
down trade barriers. 
Presumably, the promulgation of FTAs will result in more cross
border transactions between states and consequently increase global 
wealth. However, even though states execute FTAs, such execution 
might result in the taxation of cross
In this double taxation scenario, FTAs may not be enough to promote 
increased cross-border transactions. Thus, to promote 
economic development, states and international organizations should 
attempt to prevent instances of double taxation through tax treaties.
To illustrate how a tax treaty could help prevent double taxation 
of cross-border transactions, consider the fo
Assume that a Korean multi
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further that the Korean income tax rate is thirty percent and U.S. 
income tax rate is thirty percent. 
Thus, X pays a tax of $120,000 [($200,00017 + $200,00018) x 
30%] to the Korean government, and Y pays a tax of $60,000 
($200,00019 x 30%) to the U.S. government. So, the total income tax 
paid by both X and Y is $180,000 and the net income of both X and Y 
is $220,000 [($200,000 + $200,000) – $180,000].  
However, if the Korean government allows X a foreign tax credit 
of $60,000 against the income tax paid to the U.S. government by Y 
under the Korea-U.S. Tax Treaty, the total income tax paid by both X 
and Y is $120,000 [($200,000 + $200,000) x 30% + $60,00020 - 
$60,00021], and the net income of both X and Y is $280,000 
[($200,000 + $200,000) - $120,000]. This foreign tax credit of 
$60,000 against the U.S. source income protects X from “double 
taxation” on the U.S. source income.  
As demonstrated above, if this credit were not in place, X and Y 
would pay 60% (30% + 30%) of income tax on the U.S. source 
income of $200,000, and such double taxation would hinder cross-
border transactions. Therefore, to drive global economic 
development, it is crucial that the global community promote the 
extension of a network of tax treaties to eliminate double taxation of 
cross-border transactions.22  
c) Taxing Rights 
While extending FTAs, promoting a network of tax treaties, and 
building up a legal structure to promote growth in the global 
economy is important, another problem remains. Where free trade 
increases by eliminating trade barriers, disputes between trading 
states over taxing rights are likely to become very heated. To solve 
this problem, the global community should attempt to alleviate taxing 
rights competition.  
The right to tax is generally affected by international tax law, not 
domestic tax law. Thus, as trade barriers are eliminated, it is expected 
that each state will enlarge the scope of taxing rights by 
strengthening its international tax law. Today, most international tax 
issues (residency, permanent establishment, withholding tax on 
dividends, interest, royalty, capital gains, other income, etc.) are 
resolved through standardized tax treaties between related states. The 
                                                           
17 Korean source taxable income. 
18 U.S. source taxable income. 
19 U.S. source taxable income. 
20 U.S. source tax: $200,000 x 30%. 
21 Foreign tax credit allowed by the Korean government. 
22 Tax treaties prevent both double taxation and fiscal evasion.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 7 
85 
 
provisions in these tax treaties allocate rights to tax based on the type 
of transaction or income. 
However, transfer pricing has always been a significant problem 
in the field of international tax law. Because tax treaties do not 
normally address the tax issues related to transfer pricing, states 
generally rely on their domestic tax law or refer to OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines to resolve transfer pricing matters. Moreover, 
because dealing with transfer pricing requires a detailed analysis of 
many variables (e.g. function, risk burden, market circumstance, and 
character of goods or services), it is not easy to find a solution that 
will satisfy both taxpayers and governmental tax authorities. Because 
of these complexities, transfer pricing is becoming a large-scale 
problem in the global community. When one state tries to 
unreasonably exercise its taxation rights to secure additional fiscal 
revenue, the situation becomes even more aggravated. Thus, it is 
imperative that global organizations and the global community 
attempt to address this growing and complex problem.  
i) Transfer Pricing Affecting Taxing Rights 
States that execute FTAs will likely see their customs revenue 
gradually decline and eventually disappear. Accordingly, as the level 
of international trade increases, these states will likely exert greater 
effort to secure fiscal revenue through strengthening taxation rights. 
This would result in severe competition among states to tax 
international transactions.  In particular, competition for taxing rights 
would likely lead tax authorities to increase their scrutiny of 
transactions between multinational enterprises and their foreign 
subsidiaries (i.e. transfer pricing). To illustrate why this would be the 
likely outcome, consider the following example:  
Assume that an automobile manufacturing parent company (A) 
located in the U.S. conducts sales activities through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary (B) in Korea. A manufactures a model of car (X) in the 
U.S. and sells them to B in an arm’s length transaction for 40 million 
South Korean Won (KRW). Further assume that, A incurs a cost of 
30 million KRW to manufacturer X and that B sells X in Korea for 50 
million KRW.  
If no other expenses are incurred, A and B will each realize 10 
million KRW in profit from each car sold,23 and therefore must report 
this amount to the Korean and U.S. governments. If we assume that 
the tax rate is 35% in the U.S. and 30% in Korea, A must pay the 
U.S. government a tax of 3.5 million KRW per car (10 million KRW 
                                                           
23 A’s earnings = 40 million KRW – 30 million KRW. B’s earnings = 50 million KRW – 
40 million KRW.  
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x 35%), and B must pay the Korean Government a tax of 3 million 
KRW per car (10 million KRW x 30%). 
Since B was established based on Korean business law, it is an 
entity legally independent and separate from A, which was 
established pursuant to U.S. business law. However, since B deals 
only with goods manufactured by A and is under the control of A 
with respect to business activities in Korea, both can be economically 
considered as one integrated entity. As such, even if A determines to 
sell the car to B at a price exceeding the arm’s length price of 40 
million KRW, B could not object to this determination. Thus, if A 
transacts with B at 43 million KRW per car, A will realize 13 million 
KRW of profit on each car whereas B will only realize 7 million 
KRW of profit on each car. Accordingly, for each car sold, A will pay 
4.55 million KRW in taxes24 to the U.S. government, while B will 
pay 2.1 million KRW in taxes25 to the Korean government.  
 
 A’s tax payment to the 
U.S. government 
B’s tax payment to 
the Korean 
government 
Trade at arm’s 
length 
3,500,000 KRW 3,000,000 KRW 
Trade at non-arm’s 
length 
4,550,000 KRW 2,100,000 KRW 
Difference + 1,050,000 KRW - 900,000 KRW 
 
Therefore, at a selling price of 43 million KRW per car, the U.S. 
government will collect an additional 1.05 million KRW in tax per 
car, while the Korean government loses 0.9 million KRW in tax per 
car. Where 100,000 X model cars are sold at non-arm’s length price, 
the tax loss of the Korean government would be 90 billion KRW 
(900,000 KRW x 100,000 cars). Thus, to prevent great financial loss 
to governments, each state would be highly incentivized to try and 
secure its taxation rights by scrutinizing intra-company transactions 
of multinational enterprises. 
ii) Equity of Taxing Rights between States 
                                                           
24 13 million KRW x 35%.  
25 7 million KRW x 30%. 
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The role of a state’s tax authority must change as globalization 
increases. Although tax authorities traditionally focus on maintaining 
fairness among individual taxpayers, as globalization increases, tax 
authorities should also strive to maintain fairness among taxing rights 
of the states. To aid states with this additional burden, the global 
community must promote the research and development of a system 
designed to maintain equity, not only between individual taxpayers, 
but between states as well. This system will require tax authorities to 
shift their approach to tax issues, primarily from a micro-perspective 
to a macro-perspective.26  
The general principle for determining taxpayer fairness is fairly 
simple: taxpayers who have the same income bear the same tax 
burden. However, the general principle for determining fairness 
between states is slightly more complex: a taxpayer’s mixed profit 
earned by engaging in cross-border transactions with related overseas 
parties should be allocated to each state based largely on the function 
performed and risk burden assumed by the taxpayer in each state.27 
Because this is a transfer pricing issue, the market conditions and the 
character of goods or services can be considered when necessary. 
For example, a taxpayer in State A engaging in a cross-border 
transaction with related overseas parties located in States B and C, 
realizes 100 million USD of mixed profit in these three states. The 
taxing rights on this mixed profit should be allocated to A, B, and C 
on the basis of the function performed and risk burden assumed by 
the taxpayer in A, B, and C.28 Otherwise, the door is open for 
manipulating and infringing upon the taxing rights of each state. 
Consequently, the global community must pay more attention to the 
fairness of taxing rights between states by developing more 
reasonable allocation rules based on function and risk burden.  
iii) Abstention from Unreasonable Exercise of Taxing Rights  
In cross-border transactions, when one state exercises its taxing 
rights unreasonably, it infringes upon the taxing rights of another 
state. To illustrate, recall the transfer pricing example above where 
                                                           
26 See Sung-Soo Han, Strategic Approach toward the Amendment of the Korea-U.S. Tax 
Treaty 41 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Seoul), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=sung_soo_han (in Korean 
only). 
27 Every transaction between related parties, including those involving goods, services, 
interest, royalties, etc., can produce a mixed profit.  
28 Taxpayers normally pay taxes to the government as consideration for protection of their 
business activities. If a multinational enterprise doing world-wide business realized $100,000 of 
mixed profit in countries A, B, and C, and it incurred $20,000 in expenses in A (reflecting its 
function and risk burden), $30,000 of expenses in B, and $50,000 of expenses in C, it would be 
reasonable that $100,000 in mixed profits be allocated to A, B, and C based on their expenses as 
follows: $20,000 [$100,000 x $20,000 / ($20,000 + $30,000 + $50,000)] to A, $30,000 to B, 
and $50,000 to C.  
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we assumed that the arm’s-length price between A and B for one 
model X car was 40 million KRW. In that example, what if the U.S. 
tax authority argued that A should have sold model X cars to B at the 
greater-than-arm’s-length price of 43 million KRW, and then 
unilaterally exercised its taxing rights on that basis? The likely result 
would be a unilateral infringement upon the taxing rights of the 
Korean tax authority.  
Additionally, multinational enterprises performing cross-border 
transactions might manipulate the transaction price with related 
overseas parties (such as their subsidiaries) to reduce their overall tax 
burden.  Since this type of price manipulation affects the taxing 
rights of states, tax authorities will generally scrutinize cross-border 
transactions of multinational enterprises.  However, even when 
multinational enterprises believe that their cross-border transactions 
were conducted at an arm’s-length price, a states’ tax authority may 
not always acknowledge the transaction price determined by these 
multinational enterprises during a tax audit. Accordingly, 
multinational enterprises are normally uncertain as to what tax 
authorities will determine is the arm’s-length price.  
Thus, states that unreasonably exercise their taxing rights, and 
consider only their own fiscal revenue, often harm multinational 
enterprises. Accordingly, states should abstain from the unreasonable 
exercise of their taxing rights and the global community should 
promote bilateral or multilateral Advance Pricing Agreements 
(APAs) and introduce much clearer transfer pricing rules such as 
“adjustment on the uncontrolled effect of foreign exchange rate,” and 
the “use of multiple year data,” discussed below.  
iv) Promotion of Advance Pricing Agreements 
It is in a taxpayer’s best interest to enter into bilateral or 
unilateral APAs. Entering into APAs with tax authorities can prevent 
transfer pricing audits and therefore can protect a taxpayer from 
unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments. However, problems arise 
where there is no tax treaty between two related states. Without a tax 
treaty, it is impossible to execute a bilateral APA to prevent 
unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments from either or both tax 
authorities. Of course, even in the absence of a tax treaty, it is 
possible for a taxpayer to execute a unilateral APA with one state’s 
tax authority. Though, a unilateral APA would not protect a taxpayer 
from a transfer pricing adjustment instigated by another state. Thus, 
to further the development of the global community, countries must 
promote bilateral APAs. But, because bilateral APAs are only 
possible where there is a tax treaty, the global community should first 
promote the extension of a network of tax treaties. 
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Nonetheless, transfer pricing is an issue best settled by tax 
authorities, rather than taxpayers, since transfer pricing affects the 
taxing rights of each state. From the standpoint of a taxpayer, it does 
not matter whether one state imposes more taxing rights than another 
state as long as the taxpayer’s overall tax burden is the same. To 
illustrate, consider the following example:  
Assume that a U.S. company (A) sells a car (X) to its Korean 
branch (B) at 40 million KRW. Its manufacturing cost in the U.S. 
market is 30 million KRW, and the selling price in the Korean 
market is 50 million KRW. Also, assume that both the U.S. and 
Korean income tax rates are 30%. Assuming that there are no other 
expenses related to this transaction, A would realize 10 million KRW 
(40 million KRW – 30 million KRW) in income and B would realize 
10 million KRW (50 million KRW – 40 million KRW) in income. 
The combined income tax paid by both A and B would be 6 million 
KRW [(10 million KRW + 10 million KRW) x 30%].29  
Now suppose that A sells X to B at 45 million KRW. As a result, 
A would realize 15 million KRW (45 million KRW – 30 million 
KRW) in income, and B would receive 5 million KRW (50 million 
KRW – 45 million KRW) in income. Here, the total income tax paid 
by both A and B is 6 million KRW [(15 million KRW + 5 million 
KRW) x 30%], which is the same as the above example.  
Thus, if the total tax burden is the same, there is no reason a 
taxpayer would manipulate the transfer price between related parties. 
Nevertheless, this issue is still relevant for taxpayers because they 
could face unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments where two tax 
authorities have different tax arrangements. This serves to support the 
concept illustrated above that transfer pricing is an issue that should 
be managed and resolved by the relevant states’ tax authorities rather 
than by taxpayers. In other words, tax authorities should pay more 
attention to the transfer pricing issue than taxpayers and should 
actively seek out and execute, at its own expense, bilateral or 
multilateral APAs with other contracting states.  
The APA statistics for Korea, which introduced a transfer pricing 
regime in 1996, are as follows30: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
29 For simplicity, an explanation of foreign tax credits is omitted. 
30 S.Kor. Nat’l Tax Serv., APA ANNUAL REPORT (2008) (on file with author). 
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 Unilateral APA Bilateral APA Total 
Received Processed Pending Received Processed Pending Received Processed Pending 
2002 9  9 24 10 14 33 10 23 
2003 3 2 10 4 3 15 7 5 25 
2004 6 7 9 10 3 22 16 10 31 
2005 15 4 20 10 3 29 25 7 49 
2006 12 8 24 12 16 25 24 24 49 
2007 19 13 30 13 7 31 32 20 61 
2008 13 16 27 22 14 39 35 30 66 
Total 77 50  95 56  172 106  
 
The APA statistics for Japan, which introduced a transfer pricing 
regime in 1986, are as follows31:  
 
 By 2004 By 2005 By 2006 By 2007 By 2008 
Applied 51 76 92 93 111 
Completed 34 32 72 70 70 
Carried-
over 
160 204 224 247 288 
 
Considering the number of APA renewals and the number of 
multinational enterprises in existence, the APA statistics above 
indicate that administration and utilization of APAs is now more 
important than ever. 
v) Uncontrolled Effect of Foreign Exchange Rate  
Every cross-border transaction is affected by foreign exchange 
rates. Foreign exchange rates can affect the appropriateness of 
transfer pricing methodologies. Because transfer pricing affects the 
taxing rights of each state, and the appropriateness of transfer pricing 
                                                           
31 Data provided by Kazufumi Limori in presentation at IFA China, Japan and Korea Tax 
Conference, in Seoul, Korea (May 19 - 20, 2010) (on file with author). 
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between related parties is determined by an arm’s-length price, it is 
necessary to determine an arm’s-length price. If an arm’s-length price 
could be accurately determined, it would not be difficult to maintain 
fair taxing rights between related states.  
The 2009 OECD transfer pricing guidelines describe various 
transfer pricing methods, including traditional transaction methods 
and transactional profit methods. Traditional transaction methods 
include the “comparable uncontrolled price method” (CUP), “resale 
price method,” and “cost plus method.” Transactional profit methods 
include the “profit split method” and “transactional net margin 
method” (TNMM).32 
According to the OECD guidelines, in order to use any of the 
traditional transaction methods, one of the following two conditions 
must be met: “(1.) none of the differences (if any) between the 
transactions being compared or between the enterprises undertaking 
those transactions [can] materially affect the price in the open 
market; or (2.) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to 
eliminate the material effects of such differences.”33 
Conversely, the transactional profit method does not require any 
conditions to be met. The transactional profit method, as mentioned 
above, is divided into two methods: (1) the profit split method and 
(2) the transactional net margin method. “One strength of the profit 
split method is that it generally does not rely directly on closely 
comparable transactions, and it can therefore be used in cases when 
no such transactions between independent enterprises can be 
identified.”34 The strength of the transactional net margin method is 
that “net margins (e.g. return on assets, operating income to sales, 
and possibly other measures of net profit) are less affected by 
transactional differences than is the case with price, as used in the 
CUP [m]ethod.”35 
In reality, it is practically impossible to compare companies 
doing identical or substantially similar transactions in terms of 
function, risk burden, and character of goods or services. For this 
reason, the transactional profit method is used more frequently than 
the traditional transaction method to allocate the taxing rights of each 
country. In addition, because the transactional profit method 
normally allows a certain level of taxing rights, tax authorities tend to 
                                                           
32 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 52-65, 68-81 (2009), 
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2309111E.PDF [hereinafter 2009 
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES]. 
33 Id. at 53, 55, 60. 
34 Id. at 69.  
35 Id. at 75. 
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prefer this method, unless, of course, the traditional transaction 
method allows for more taxing rights.  
Although each state’s tax authority prefers the transactional 
profit method for the more convenient transfer pricing administration 
that it provides, changes in foreign exchange rates, which cannot be 
controlled by a taxpayer, can negatively affect the appropriateness of 
this method unless a proper foreign exchange rate adjustment is 
made. Foreign exchange rates can, of course, also affect the 
appropriateness of using other transfer pricing methodologies, such 
as the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price 
method, and the cost plus method. In other words, since foreign 
exchange rates affect every cross-border transaction, it must be 
studied very closely and objectively in order to prevent arbitrary 
taxation. Since the transactional net margin method (TNNM) is 
perhaps the most frequently used method, the effects of foreign 
exchange rates under this method as well as a reasonable approach to 
countering these effects are discussed below.36  
(1) Change of Import Price and Profit 
As stated above, a change in foreign exchange rates can greatly 
affect the international price of goods. Furthermore, because a private 
enterprise cannot control changes in the foreign exchange rate, it 
faces unexpected profits or losses when the foreign exchange rate 
changes substantially. To illustrate this concept, consider the 
following example: 
Assume that in the second half of 2007, a German company (X) 
made a business decision to sell its product (Z) to its Korean 
distributor (Y) at the price of 20 Euros in 2008, and that the 
forecasted average foreign exchange rate for 2008 is 1200 KRW per 
one Euro. Thus, if the foreign exchange rate does not change between 
2007 and 2008, the import price paid by Y to X in the year 2008 will 
be 24,000 KRW (20 Euros x 1200 KRW).  
However, if the foreign exchange rate increases to 1500 KRW 
per 1 Euro in the year 2008, the import price paid by Y to X in the 
year 2008 becomes 30,000 KRW (20 Euros x 1500 KRW). Thus, Y 
will pay an additional 6000 KRW (30,000 KRW – 24,000 KRW) for 
the goods because of the change in foreign exchange rates. 
Accordingly, Y’s operating profit decreases by 6000 KRW. Thus, 
variations in foreign exchange rates can greatly affect an enterprise’s 
profit. 
(2) Adjustment of Foreign Exchange Rate  
                                                           
36 The same approach would be applied to other TP methodologies. 
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The table below shows trends in foreign exchange rates from 
2002 to 2008.37  
 
Foreign Exchange Rate Trend (Average Buyer’s Rate / Euro: KRW) 
Unit: KRW 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Jan. 1189.69 1276.03 1522.63 1390.87 1218.58 1241.18 1413.79 
Feb. 1169.53 1308.65 1503.20 1360.45 1182.77 1249.52 1423.19 
Mar. 1181.80 1357.41 1458.46 1355.06 1196.16 1274.23 1549.75 
Apr. 1191.46 1365.47 1408.77 1344.79 1193.16 1282.67 1585.99 
May 1183.91 1419.96 1440.27 1297.13 1255.56 1279.06 1646.67 
June 1192.68 1421.00 1435.31 1253.51 1232.73 1269.69 1633.60 
July 1199.38 1372.22 1449.01 1274.36 1230.21 1285.10 1638.70 
Aug. 1193.02 1340.64 1440.17 1279.45 1255.08 1297.71 1592.63 
Sept. 1208.37 1334.89 1428.87 1287.21 1239.03 1316.88 1659.93 
Oct. 1241.91 1392.66 1457.08 1283.02 1226.37 1329.20 1800.44 
Nov. 1237.96 1413.08 1444.46 1253.47 1229.30 1372.38 1804.09 
Dec. 1254.77 1439.15 1436.62 1238.19 1247.12 1382.21 1882.82 
% Change  19.0% -0.2% -13.82% 0.7% 10.8% 36.22% 
 
The table above shows that the foreign exchange rate increased 
19% from 2002 to 2003. Applying these real world numbers to our 
hypothetical would mean that the import price of Y in 2003 increased 
19%, resulting in a significant decrease in Y’s operating margin.38 
Accordingly, if Y’s operating margin decreases solely because of an 
increase in the foreign exchange rate, bringing it out of an arm’s-
length range under TNMM, the negative effect on operating margin 
                                                           
37 KOREA EXCHANGE BANK, http://www.keb.co.kr/IBS/goContents.jsp?co (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2011). Note that the fluctuation rate is based on the rate in December of the previous 
year. 
38 Since the foreign exchange rate increased 36.22% in 2008 compared to 2007, it would 
result in a larger decrease in Y’s operating margin.  
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caused by the change of foreign exchange rate should be adjusted 
through transfer pricing. To illustrate, consider both the above and 
the table below, which lists the operating margins for a hypothetical 
target company as well as the arm’s-length range for operating 
margins of several comparable companies:39  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Upper 
quartile 
8.385% 9.683% 3.823% 6.658% 8.613% 7.726% 
Median 5.004% 8.076% 3.501% 4.555% 6.673% 6.056% 
Lower 
quartile 
2.928% 5.648% 2.095% 3.053% 4.558% 3.223% 
Target 
company 
4.136% 3.170% 4.622% 8.017% 7.275% 5.444% 
 
In 2003, for example, the foreign exchange rate increased 19% 
and affected the import price and thus the operating margin of the 
target company. In fact, the target company’s operating margin in 
2003 (3.170%) is lower than the arm’s-length range during that same 
year (5.648%~9.683%). If the foreign exchange rate had not 
increased 19% in 2003, the target company’s operating margin would 
have been within the arm’s arm’s-length range.  
Furthermore, observe that the target company’s operating 
margins in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 exceeded the upper quartile of 
an arm’s-length range. It would be very unreasonable and unfair if a 
tax authority only made a transfer pricing adjustment in 2003. 
Accordingly, in terms of transfer pricing, a tax authority should 
adjust the operating margin of the target company in each year by 
eliminating the amount of profit/loss caused by fluctuations in 
foreign exchange rates that are beyond the arm’s-length range. 
Of course, if fluctuations in foreign exchange rates affect the 
operating margins of a target company and comparable companies to 
the same degree, it would not be necessary to adjust the operating 
margin of the target company. The foreign exchange rate should be 
adjusted only when it would lead to a more reasonable result.40 
Adjusting transfer pricing without adjusting the foreign exchange 
                                                           
39 The statute of limitations on tax audits is normally five years in Korea. Thus, the tax 
authority scrutinizes five-year data at the time of a TP audit.  
40 Since the facts and circumstances surrounding each company’s transactions differ, the 
foreign exchange adjustment should be made in the most reasonable way—on a case-by-case 
basis.  
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rate would result in an arbitrary double taxation. Because OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines do not currently have a clear rule 
pertaining to the effects of foreign exchange rate fluctuations, the 
OECD should consider introducing such a transfer pricing rule to 
prevent unilateral and arbitrary TP adjustment. 
(3) Use of Multi-Year Data 
Information pertaining to foreign exchange rate adjustments is 
often not available because there is no readily accessible data 
showing the effect of foreign exchange rates on comparable 
companies. Under such circumstances, it is best to use multiple year 
data to determine the appropriateness of transfer pricing. 
Furthermore, foreign exchange rates are often cyclical—that is, they 
move up and down over the years. A portion of the table above, 
entitled “Foreign Exchange Rate Trend (Average Buyer’s Rate / 
Euro: KRW),” has been inserted below to show the cyclical nature of 
exchange rates.  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
% Change   19.0% -0.2% -13.82% 0.7% 10.8% 36.22% 
 
The Foreign Exchange Rate Trend table excerpt above shows 
that, although the target company’s operating margin in the year 
2003 is below the arm’s length range, its operating margins in the 
year 2004 and the year 2005 exceed the arm’s length range. As a 
result, its five-year average operating margin is within the arm’s 
length range, and therefore it would not be reasonable to make an 
additional adjustment in 2003. Thus, because foreign exchange rates 
are often cyclical, it is crucial that tax authorities us multi-year data 
when reviewing the appropriateness of transfer pricing arrangements.  
OECD Transfer Pricing guideline 3.44 states:  
 
Multiple year data should be considered in the 
transactional net margin method for both the 
enterprise under examination and independent 
enterprises to the extent their net margins are being 
compared, to take into account the effects on profits 
of product life cycles and short term economic 
conditions. For example, multiple year data could 
show whether the independent enterprises that 
engaged in comparable uncontrolled transactions 
had suffered from the effects of market conditions in 
the same way and over a similar period as the 
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associated enterprise under examination. Such data 
could also show whether similar business patterns 
over a similar length of time affected the profits of 
comparable independent enterprises in the same way 
as the enterprise under examination.41  
Unfortunately, the abstract nature of this rule makes it hard to 
apply or understand, and leads to controversy regarding its 
construction. Moreover, the tendency of some tax authorities to treat 
this rule merely as a non-mandatory guideline further complicates the 
issue. Thus, the OECD should clarify this rule to make it more 
effective. 
vi) Prevention of Tax Avoidance Through Roundabout 
Transactions 
As discussed earlier, the competition for taxing rights between 
related states could increase once trade barriers are eliminated. The 
global community should take a systematic approach to prevent the 
discouragement of cross-border transactions that can result from 
competition over taxing rights between states. In addition, to prevent 
double taxation and tax avoidance tactics, each state should actively 
create new tax treaties or supplement existing tax treaties. 
A large part of the problem occurs when taxpayers engaged in 
cross-border transactions infringe upon the taxation rights of related 
states by shopping for loopholes in tax treaties. Treaty shopping is 
performed through roundabout transactions, which frustrate the 
intended equality of taxing rights between partners. Thus, it is 
imperative that the global community establish a common set of rules 
to prevent these kinds of roundabout transactions.  
Comments to Article 1 of the 2008 OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital recommend various rules to 
prevent the improper use of the Convention.42 These rules include:  
 
i) provisions aimed at conduit companies,  
ii) provisions aimed at entities benefiting from preferential 
tax regimes,  
iii) provisions aimed at particular types of income,  
iv) anti-abuse rules dealing with source taxation of specific 
types of income, and  
                                                           
41 2009 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 80.  
42 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
ON CAPITAL (CONDENSED VERSION) 45-63 (2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/41147804/pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION]. 
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v) provisions aimed at preferential regimes introduced after 
the signature of the convention.  
The global community should pay special attention to 
roundabout transactions performed through “conduit companies.” 
Roundabout transactions result in an infringement of the taxation 
rights of treaty partners not intended by the parties to the treaty. 
Every state should implement a legal system to prevent such tax 
avoidance strategies.  
(1) Example of Roundabout Transactions Used for Tax 
Avoidance43 
[Issue]: Does the recipient of interest (X) in the following 
scenario qualify as a “beneficial owner of interest”?  
[Facts]: Due to the Korean financial crisis in 1997, a Korean 
multinational company (A) decided to sell its Korean subsidiary (B), 
Chinese subsidiaries (C and D), and a U.S. subsidiary (E) to a U.S. 
fund.  
The U.S. fund established X corporation in Hungary, Y 
corporation in Luxembourg, Z corporation in the British Virgin 
Islands and then provided the funding necessary for the operation of 
these corporations.  
Z borrowed $300 million from a U.S. investment bank and 
loaned or invested it as follows: 
 
- Capital investment to X: $29 million 
- Capital investment to Y: $15,000 
- Loan to Y: $116 million 
- Loan to another British Virgin Islands company: $121 
million 
- Loan to C and D: $34 million 
 
Subsequently, Y loaned the $116 million borrowed from Z to X, 
and X loaned $145 million ($116 million borrowed from Y with the 
$29 million invested from Z) to B (the Korean subsidiary)—the 
above transactions taking place almost simultaneously.  
According to the loan agreement between X and B, B paid 
11.72% of interest to X, whereas X paid 11.47% of interest to Y. 
Thus, X realized the 0.25%44 difference as profit. Altogether, X 
realized i) $3,398,80045 in income by loaning its own capital to B, 
                                                           
43 Id. 
44 11.72% less 11.47%. 
45 $29,000,000 x 11.72%. 
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and ii) $290,00046 in income by loaning the funds borrowed from Z 
to B every year. X paid a 3% corporate tax on its income to the 
Hungarian government.  
[Position of Korean tax authority]: Since X is a mere conduit 
company, X cannot enjoy the benefit of Article 11 of the Korea-
Hungary Tax Treaty47. Therefore, Article 13 of the Korea-U.S. Tax 
Treaty should apply where a beneficial owner of interest resides, and 
B is obligated to withhold a 12% tax from the interest amount paid to 
X.48 
(2) Anti-avoidance Rule  
If there is no clear anti-avoidance rule preventing roundabout 
transactions, taxpayers will continue to exploit this loophole in tax 
treaties to avoid taxes. Further, the absence of a clear anti-avoidance 
rule greatly increases the likelihood of tax disputes between 
taxpayers and tax authorities due to the ambiguity of the rule. Thus, 
if anti-tax avoidance rules are not universally applied, it will be 
impossible to prevent tax avoidance through roundabout transactions. 
- Introduction of Anti-avoidance Rules into Domestic Tax Law - 
As illustrated above, tax avoidance through roundabout 
transactions is possible by taking advantage of loopholes in tax 
treaties with third party states. In other words, even if a treaty signed 
between two states has no loophole that would permit tax avoidance 
tactics, an enterprise may still avoid payment of taxes and circumvent 
the treaty by exploiting loopholes extant in other treaties with third 
party states. Therefore, a state that wants to prevent tax avoidance 
should insert an anti-avoidance rule in its tax treaty with every 
related and third party state. Even if only one tax treaty has a 
loophole, this loophole can circumvent every other tax treaty that 
does not have one.  
For example, although Korea has executed seventy-three tax 
treaties to date, if there is a loophole in one tax treaty (such as in the 
Hungary example above), this loophole can incapacitate the Korea-
U.S. Tax Treaty as well as other Korean tax treaties. Therefore, as 
illustrated by this example, the Korean tax authority needs a unified 
                                                           
46 $116,000,000 x 0.25(11.72-11.47). 
47 See Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty art. 11, para. 1, Kor.-Hung., Mar. 29, 1989 (providing 
that “Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State 
shall be taxable only in that other State.”).  
48 See id. at art. 11, para 1, 2. (“Paragraph 1: Interest derived from sources within one of 
the Contracting States by a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed by both 
Contracting States. Paragraph 2: The rate of tax imposed by one of the Contracting States on 
interest derived from sources within that Contracting State by a resident of the other 
Contracting State shall not exceed 12 per cent of the gross amount.”). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 7 
99 
 
tax treaty policy in order to prevent tax avoidance through 
roundabout transactions. However, because it is not practical to 
amend all existing tax treaties at the same time, it is necessary to 
introduce anti-avoidance rules into domestic tax laws. The OECD 
has stated that anti-tax avoidance provisions in international tax 
treaties allow for such domestic anti-avoidance rules.49  
- Beneficial Owner Rule of the U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty - 
Anti-avoidance rules must be drafted clearly for both tax 
authorities and taxpayers. If not, unnecessary disputes between tax 
authorities and taxpayers can arise. The U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, 
revised on November 6, 2006, introduced the “clear beneficial 
owner” rule to prevent roundabout transactions in relation to the 
payment of dividends (Article 10), interest (Article 11), royalties 
(Article 14), and other income (Article 21).50 Paragraph 11, Article 
11 of the U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty provides:  
 
A resident of a Contracting State shall not be considered 
the beneficial owner of interest in respect of a debt-claim 
if such debt-claim would not have been established 
unless a person:  
(a) that is not entitled to benefits with respect to 
interest arising in the other Contracting State 
which are equivalent to, or more favorable 
than, those available under this Convention to 
a resident of the first-mentioned Contracting 
State; and  
(b) that is not a resident of either Contracting 
State; held an equivalent debt-claim against 
the first-mentioned resident.51 
                                                           
49 See COMMENTARY TO MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 42, at 49, 58 
(Commentary 9.2 provides, “[T]o the extent these anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic 
domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability, 
they are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general 
rule, there will be no conflict between such rules and the provisions of tax conventions.” 
Commentary 9.4 provides, “Under both approaches, therefore, it is agreed that States do not 
have to grant the benefits of a double taxation convention where arrangements that constitute 
an abuse of the provisions of the convention have been entered into.” Finally, commentary 22.1 
provides, “Such rules are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for 
determining which facts give rise to a tax liability; these rules are not addressed in tax treaties 
and are therefore not affected by them.”). 
50 See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, U.S.-Japan, arts. 10, 11, 14, 
21, Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/japan.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty]. 
51 U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 11, para. 11. See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
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The operation of this rule can be illustrated by the following 
example:  
A, a U.S. resident, holds a debt-claim against X, a Japanese 
company which entitles A to interest of 10x each year. B, a resident 
of a third country that does not have a tax treaty with Japan, holds a 
debt-claim against A that entitles B to interest of 10x each year and 
otherwise has terms that are equivalent to the terms of the debt-claim 
held by A. Furthermore, A would not have an established debt-claim 
against X if B did not hold a debt-claim against A. X pays interest of 
10x to A, who then pays interest of 10x to B. Under paragraph 11, A 
will not be considered the beneficial owner of the interest from X, 
and is therefore not entitled to treaty benefits with respect to the 
interest from X.52  
If this kind of clear anti-avoidance rule is introduced into all tax 
treaties or domestic tax laws, it is possible to prevent tax avoidance 
activities through roundabout transactions. For instance, if this rule 
was applied to the Hungary example above, X would not be a 
beneficial owner of interest since X just passed on to B the $116 
million borrowed from Y.  
- Limitation on Beneficial Owner Rule of the U.S.-Japan Tax 
Treaty - 
In addition to the beneficial owner rule, the U.S.-Japan Tax 
Treaty, revised on November 6, 2006, introduced the “limitation on 
benefits” (LOB) rule.53 Paragraph 1, Article 22 of the U.S.-Japan Tax 
Treaty provides: 
                                                                                                                           
AND JAPAN FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL 
EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS, SIGNED AT 
WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 6, 2003 55 (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/japante04.pdf. 
52 See Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the United States and Japan for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-Japan, art. 11, para. 11, Nov. 6, 2003. [hereinafter 
Technical Explanation Between the U.S. and Japan], 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/tejapan04.pdf. 
53 See U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 22 and Technical Explanation between 
the U.S. and Japan, supra note 52, at art.22, para. 1 (explaining the purpose of limitation on 
benefits provisions such as Article 22 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty to be as follows: “The United 
States views an income tax treaty as a vehicle for providing treaty benefits to residents of the 
two Contracting States. The proper operation of a treaty requires that it apply to those that are 
bona fide residents of one of the Contracting States for the purpose of being granted treaty 
benefits. This principal [sic] has long been recognized. For example, the Commentaries to the 
OECD Model authorize a tax authority to deny treaty benefits, under substance-over-form 
principles, to a nominee in one Contracting State deriving income from the other on behalf of a 
third-country resident. In addition, although the text of the OECD Model does not contain 
express anti-abuse provisions, the Commentary to Article 1 contains an extensive discussion 
regarding the appropriateness of such provisions in tax treaties in order to limit the ability of 
third state residents to obtain treaty benefits. The United States holds strongly to the view that 
tax treaties should include provisions that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of 
third countries. Consequently, all recent U.S. income treaties contain comprehensive Limitation 
on Benefits provisions.”).  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 7 
101 
 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a resident 
of a Contracting State that derives income from the 
other Contracting State shall be entitled to all the 
benefits accorded to residents of a Contracting State for 
a taxable year by the provisions of other Articles of this 
Convention only if such resident satisfies any other 
specified conditions for the obtaining of such benefits 
and is either:  
(a) an individual;  
(b) a Contracting State, any political subdivision 
or local authority thereof, the Bank of Japan or 
the Federal Reserve Banks;  
(c) a company, if:  
(i) the principal class of its shares, and 
any disproportionate class of its shares, is 
listed or registered on a recognized stock 
exchange specified in clause (i) or (ii) of 
subparagraph (b) of paragraph 5 and is 
regularly traded on one or more 
recognized stock exchanges; or  
(ii) at least 50 percent of each class of 
shares in the company is owned directly 
or indirectly by five or fewer residents 
entitled to benefits under clause (i), 
provided that, in the case of indirect 
ownership, each intermediate owner is a 
person entitled to the benefits of this 
Convention under this paragraph.54 
                                                           
54 U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 22 (explaining further that the remainder 
of U.S.-Japan Treaty Article 22 limitation on benefits provision reads, “(d) a person described 
in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 4;  
(e) a pension fund, provided that as of the end of the prior taxable year more than 50 
percent of its beneficiaries, members or participants are individuals who are residents of 
either Contracting State; or (f) a person other than an individual, if: (i) residents that are 
described in subparagraph (a), (b), (d) or (e), or clause (i) of subparagraph (c), own, 
directly or indirectly, at least 50 percent of each class of shares or other beneficial 
interests in the person, and (ii) less than 50 percent of the person’s gross income for the 
taxable year is paid or accrued by the person in that taxable year, directly or indirectly, to 
persons who are not residents of either Contracting State in the form of payments that are 
deductible in computing its taxable income in the Contracting State of which it is a 
resident (but not including arm’s length payments in the ordinary course of business for 
services or tangible property and payments in respect of financial obligations to a 
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What happens if the Korean tax authority introduces this LOB 
rule into all tax treaties and domestic tax laws? If we assume that the 
Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty has this LOB rule and it can be applied to 
the Hungary case above, X falls within the definition of a corporation 
provided in Subparagraph (c), Paragraph 1 of Article 22. However, 
since the shares of X are owned 100% by Y and are not listed or 
registered on a recognized stock exchange, it cannot satisfy the 
requirements of (c)(i). In addition, it cannot satisfy the requirements 
of (c)(ii) since X’s shares are not directly or indirectly owned by five 
or fewer Hungarian residents. Therefore, X is not entitled to the 
benefits of the Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty. Therefore, to prevent tax 
avoidance through roundabout transactions, it is necessary to 
introduce clear anti-avoidance rules into all tax treaties or domestic 
tax laws.  
2) From the Regulatory Perspective 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008 was a result of 
the U.S. subprime mortgage loan debacle that drove many financial 
institutions to bankruptcy and crippled the global economy. To 
revive a badly ailing economy, the U.S. Democrat-controlled House 
of Representatives approved a historically large $819 billion stimulus 
bill on January 28, 2009, which focused on increased spending and 
tax cuts. Some commentators now say that the U.S. government 
should have instead focused on regulating the reckless economic 
practices that led to the disaster.55 
Today, the economic activities of the global community are more 
closely integrated than ever. Thus, an ailing economy in one state can 
easily spread to other states—the larger the economic ailment, the 
larger the global effect. The U.S. subprime mortgage loan crisis is an 
excellent example of the degree to which the global economy is 
connected. Thus, the global community has a responsibility to pay 
close attention to the issue of global economic integration when 
considering economic development. 
From a legal perspective, there should not be a substantial 
difference between regulating the global community and regulating 
an individual state in terms of preventing undesirable business 
activities. The section below will discuss the topic of global 
economic regulation from Korea’s perspective. However, instead of 
taking a case-by case approach to global regulatory analysis (which is 
the approach recommended for global regulators since different 
                                                                                                                           
commercial bank, provided that where such a bank is not a resident of a Contracting State 
such payment is attributable to a permanent establishment of that bank situated in one of 
the Contracting States.”). 
55 See Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A01.  
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business areas require individually tailored rules), this Article will 
focus on general principles for establishing regulation. For this 
reason, the discussion of global economic regulation below is 
focused on ascertaining and regulating problematic activities in terms 
of social benefit, social expense, and corruption. 
a) Regulation and Policy56 
Our society is filled with regulation and the amount of regulatory 
oversight seems to increase as society develops. Because regulatory 
laws affect individuals and their activities, they make up a large and 
essential part of national policy.  The Korean Basic Law for 
Administrative Regulation, Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1, Article 2, 
explains that the term “administrative regulation” refers to what is 
provided in laws, municipal ordinances, and rules to restrain the 
rights of the people and to impose responsibility upon the people so 
that a nation or a local autonomous authority may achieve a specific 
administrative purpose. Thus, according to the Korean Basic Law for 
Administrative Regulation, everything that has an effect on the lives 
of the people comes under the term “regulation.” 
To illustrate how regulations affect the lives of people, consider 
the following example: A person wanting to work in the intercity bus 
transportation business needs to receive a license from the Minister 
of Transportation. Moreover, a person who wants to engage in other 
bus transportation related business must receive a license from the 
Governor, according to Article 6 of the Automobile Transportation 
Business Law and Article 13 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the 
same law. The government has placed such a regulatory burden on 
the passenger transportation business in order to increase its impact 
on the national economy and to secure a certain level of safety. 
However, in reality, since these regulations endow an administrative 
agency with significant discretion, they have distorted the market 
economy and have caused many problems. 
Consider another example from the construction business: 
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Construction Business Law, the Korean 
government classifies construction projects as general construction, 
specific construction, or technical construction projects and also 
directly manages licensing of the construction business. From 1975 
through the latter half of 1989, granting new licenses in the general 
construction category was prohibited. After that time, new licenses 
were issued every three years, removing a significant restraint on 
                                                           
56 The following three sections are excerpted and adapted from SUNG-SOO HAN, ROAD TO 
DEMOCRATIC STATE WITHOUT CORRUPTION: REPORT BASED ON THE SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW, TAX AND ECONOMY 50-51 (Istory Inc., 2003), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=sung_soo_han. 
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competition. However, problems arose when large construction 
companies began setting up related companies to receive general 
construction licenses from the government to avoid bottom-line 
limitations established by the construction contract limitation system. 
These related companies would, in turn, participate in small scale 
construction to stay below the limitation.57 Thus, as can be seen by 
this example, when the government retains the right to issue licenses, 
the market does not maintain a perfectly competitive situation and 
imperfect competition results. Also, the natural flow of the markets is 
disrupted and many problems can occur as a result.  
In a perfectly competitive market, each enterprise competes with 
other enterprises, thus consumers can purchase goods or services at 
lower prices. However, governmental intervention in a market, while 
useful in preventing unnecessarily excessive competition, can 
negatively affect a market by creating imperfect competition. A 
government deciding whether to regulate could obtain the 
information necessary to establish an effective policy by comparing 
the economic benefits obtained through imperfect competition with 
those obtained through perfect competition. It is worth noting that in 
the early stages of economic development, imperfect competition can 
be economically more beneficial than perfect competition. Thus, 
some nations might consider setting up imperfect competition 
policies. 
b) The Effect of Regulation58 
This section discusses the various effects regulation may have on 
a society. For the purposes of this section, the term “policy” is 
generally defined as a set of ideas or plans that is used as a basis for 
making decisions, especially in politics, economics, or business. 
Also, for the purposes of discussion, assume that a regulation can 
produce three kinds of effects: (1) a “policy effect” when it produces 
social benefit, (2) a “non-policy effect” when it incurs social cost,59 
and (3) a “corruption effect” when it leads to corruption.60 
 
Effect of Regulation 
Policy Effect: 60% Non-policy effect: 40% 
                                                           
57 JI-HONG KIM, THE COMPETITION PROMOTION OF CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION (1990) (on file with author). 
58 See SUNG-SOO HAN, supra note 56, at 51-53.  
59 This thesis evaluates “social cost” in terms of the economic efficiency of a rule and 
distinguishes it from corruption in terms of connection to a bribe. 
60 The following discussion assumes that the three kinds of effects can be quantified from 
an economic perspective.  
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A regulation positively influences society and becomes “good 
policy” where its “policy effect” (social benefit) is greater than its 
“non-policy effect” (social cost), as shown in the table above. 
Conversely, a regulation negatively influences society and becomes 
“bad policy” where the government decides to maintain the 
regulation even when its “non-policy effect” (social cost) start to 
outweigh its “policy effect” (social benefit).  
However, in economic terms, one of the biggest regulatory 
consequences is corruption that results in the course of licensing. 
Since the right to issue a license is left to the discretion of an 
administrative agency, if there is no mechanism to control such 
discretion, the administrative agency will inevitably abuse its 
discretion. Moreover, where the standards for licensing become 
obscure, the possibility for corruption increases because 
administrative agencies can exert more even greater discretion. In 
fact, world history provides many examples of instances where 
illegality and corruption have damaged the fundamental structure of a 
national economy. Korea is one example.  
 
Effect of Regulation 
Policy Effect 
(30%) 
Non-policy Effect 
(40%) 
Corruption Effect 
(30%) 
 
As seen in the table above, where the non-policy effect of a 
regulation is 10% larger than the policy effect and its corruption 
effect is 30%, the aggregate negative effect on the national or global 
economy is 40% (10% non-policy effect + 30% corruption effect).61 
Thus, even where a regulation has a large policy effect, if the non-
policy and corruption effect together are greater than the policy 
effect, the regulation is not desirable because the non-policy and 
corruption effect completely offset the policy effect.  
 
Effect of Regulation 
Policy 
Effect(45%) 
Non-policy Effect 
(25%) 
Corruption Effect 
(30%) 
 
                                                           
61 In reality, it would be difficult to quantify each effect. However, to facilitate discussion, 
each effect is stated here as a percentage.  
WINTER 2010  Global Community 
106 
 
In another example above, although the policy effect of a 
particular regulation is 20% greater than the non-policy effect, the 
regulation has an overall negative effect on society because the 
corruption effect is at 30%. Thus, to make the regulation desirable for 
society, it is necessary to strengthen the policy effect and weaken the 
non-policy and corruption effects.  To accomplish this, the policy 
effect must be strengthened by thoroughly reviewing the content of a 
regulation and removing factors that can cause non-policy effects and 
the corruption effect must be weakened by bolstering the internal 
control system of an administrative agency. 
As mentioned above, in Korea, after 1989, the government 
allowed new construction licenses to be issued every three years, 
which removed restraints on competition that existed under the old 
regulatory scheme. However, since then, large construction 
companies have illegally set up related companies to avoid the 
bottom-line limitation established by the construction contract 
limitation system and now participate in small-scale construction to 
stay below the limitation. In this example, if the removal of restraints 
on competition produces social benefits, the regulation permitting 
such licensing does have a policy effect. Furthermore, because large 
construction companies illegally participate in small-scale 
construction, there is a corruption effect. The Korean government 
could reduce this corruption effect by strengthening the internal 
control system of the licensing agency to strictly monitor and 
eliminate corrupt activities.  
If a regulation has an adverse effect on society because its non-
policy effect is greater than its policy effect, the problem can be 
solved by reducing factors producing the non-policy effect and 
increasing factors producing the policy effect. An additional and 
perhaps better option is to simply abolish the regulation altogether. 
However, what if a regulation, such as the one related to construction 
licensing, has policy, non-policy, and corruption effects all at the 
same time?  Even if a regulation produces some corruption effect, it 
may not be desirable to abolish it without considering its policy 
effect. If a regulation has both a policy effect and a corruption effect, 
the government could strengthen the policy effect by merely 
removing the corruption effect. However, when a regulation has no 
policy effect and only a corruption effect, it may be best for society if 
the regulation were completely abolished. Finally, where the non-
policy effect is greater than the policy effect and there is also a 
corruption effect, the policy effect can be increased by removing the 
corruption and non-policy effects.  
How can a regulation’s corruption effect be removed? 
Regulation-based corruption can be divided into two types. The first 
type is where an administrative agency has too much discretion due 
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to the regulation’s obscurity. In other words, vagueness allows for 
excessive discretion which ultimately leads to corruption. In this 
situation, discretion must be reduced to the greatest extent possible 
by establishing detailed and elaborate administrative rules. The 
second type of regulation-based corruption occurs when an 
administrative agency receives a bribe in violation of a regulation. In 
this case, an internal control system under which administrative 
actions can be supervised and checked must be implemented.  
c) The Need for a Systematic Mechanism62 
In Korea, when people want to engage in business, they must 
meet the requirements of the Fire Service Law, the Public Health 
Law, and any related presidential decrees and enforcement 
ordinances that apply to their particular place of business. These rules 
function as prerequisites to obtaining a business license. If these 
related rules are not satisfied, a business license cannot be obtained.  
Naturally, because employees spend much of their time in their 
workplace, the safety conditions of the workplace can greatly 
influence the course of their lives. If an administrative agency does 
not properly supervise and guide the economic activities of 
businessmen, the possibility of dangerous conditions (e.g. fire) 
occurring in the workplace increases, thereby increasing the potential 
risk of injury or death. For this reason, administrative agencies often 
actively intervene in the economic activities of the people to prevent 
accidents from occurring.  
In general, governments implement a regulation under the 
assumption that they will benefit people. However, problems arise 
when an administrative agency misuses the regulation causing the 
social expense of the regulation to become larger than its social 
benefit. When social expenses become larger than social benefits, 
regulations lose their value. Korea provides yet another example to 
illustrate this concept. In Korea, it is easier to meet the licensing 
requirements to conduct business for a general saloon than it is for a 
luxury saloon. Because of this, saloon business owners often obtain a 
license for a general saloon but conduct their business as a luxury 
saloon. Moreover, agency officers who are aware of this practice 
often demand bribes from the business owners in exchange for 
allowing their business to continue in this illegal manner. Thus, 
corruption often occurs in situations where a person seeking a 
business license does not meet the licensing requirements established 
by law and is thus tempted to collude with an agency officer to obtain 
the license. In addition, there are also instances where corruption 
occurs merely because regulations are so obscure that they provide 
                                                           
62 See SUNG-SOO HAN, supra note 56, at 53-54. 
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administrative officers with significant wiggle room to arbitrarily 
construe licensing requirements.  
Although this portion of the Article has discussed the topic of 
economic regulation using examples from Korea, the regulatory 
mechanisms and concepts discussed above can and should be applied 
to other countries as well as the global community at large. To 
effectively alleviate regulatory problems in the global community, it 
is imperative that the global community establish a common 
regulatory mechanism that will increase social benefit, decrease 
social cost, and eliminate corruption. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the world becomes increasingly integrated through the 
process of globalization, it has become increasingly important and 
crucial to promote a global legal system and drive global economic 
development. To do so, countries and international organizations 
should promote the extension of FTAs and tax treaties, and find ways 
to cooperatively deal with international tax issues, such as taxation 
rights surrounding transfer pricing arrangements. Furthermore, 
economic development is best achieved by conducting business 
activities under a set of corresponding rules and regulations, states 
and international organizations should strive to establish a common 
regulatory mechanism that takes into account the social benefits and 
costs of regulatory measures, as well as the potential for corruption. 
The result of an international global economic and legal structure is 
an environment in which nation states and their citizens can enjoy 
economic prosperity and avoid the pitfalls of poor regulation and 
governance.63  
 
                                                           
63 A related article written by this author will be published in the Spring 2011 issue of the 
Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review. It will focus on the role 
of domestic law and tax treaties in creating a global community and explore a mechanism for 
harmonizing legal conflicts between tax treaties and domestic tax law.  
 
